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transportation of the cargo. Moreover, evidence showed that the holds had previously
contained a cargo of rock salt contributing to the damage affecting the present condition
of the cargo. The court affirmed the lower court's holding that a carrier cannot delegate
its duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to another party. Finally, the Court of Appeals felt
that peril of the sea defense was not available to defendants based on the lower courts
analysis.
The court affirmed that Bay Ocean was not a carrier within the meaning of
COGSA and therefore, was not entitled to its package limitation. In Sabah, the court
stated that the determination of whether a party is classified as a carrier under COSGA
focuses on whether that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. Under
COGSA a party is classified as a "carrier" and thereby covered by the $500-per-package
limitation on liability if that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. It is
undisputed that Bay Ocean is not explicitly named in the voyage charter between
Western Bulk and Steel Coils. Nevertheless, Bay Ocean maintained that since it was a
party to the time charter between Lake Marion and Western Bulk, they should be
considered a "carrier" within the meaning of COGSA. The Fifth Circuit found the
voyage charter was the applicable contract of carriage. However, even if the time charter
held any weight, it would still not save Bay Ocean because it merely acted as agent in the
charter, as evidenced by the express language contained in the time charter contract. In
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp . , 359 U.S. 297 ( 1956), the Supreme
Court clarified that agents do not qualify for the $500-per-package limitation,
determining that Congress did not intend to limit liability of "negligent agents of a
carrier." !d. at 301. For the foregoing reasons the decision of the district court was
affirn1ed.
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DEFIN I TIONS OF "SEAMAN" AND "VESSEL IN NAVIGATION" D EFINED
UNDER THE JONES ACT
The N ew Y ork Supreme Court erred in denying summary judgment to defendant
City of N ew Y ork where plaintiff was not a "seaman" nor working on a "vessel in
navigation" as defined by the J ones Act (46 U .S.C. § 688) .
Orr v. City of New York
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department
304 A.D. 2d 5 41
(Decided April 7, 2003)
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant, City of New York ("City"), as a "marine
oiler" or a "tankerman" at the St. George Terminal on Staten Island. Plaintiff was injured
when he stepped off a gangplank onto a barge, where he slipped on oil. Plaintiff
commenced action against the City pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) which
provided that "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
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employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury" (46 U.S.C. § 688). Thereafter, the City moved for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint. The City contended that plaintiff was not a "seaman" within
the meaning of the Jones Act because the barge at issue was not a "vessel in navigation."
The New York State Supreme Court denied the City's motion and based their decision on
a prior position that the City took in regards to plaintiffs claim for worker's
compensation benefits for the aforementioned injuries. After trial a verdict was rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and the City appealed.
On appeal the Appellate Division, Second Department found that the Jones Act
had not clearly defined the term "seaman." However, the court stated that the United
States Supreme Court had set forth two essential requirements in order to identify a
seaman: first that the employee's duties must contribute to the function of a vessel or to
the accomplishment of its mission and second that the employee has a connection to a
vessel in navigation. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). The Supreme
Court did not go on to define a "vessel in navigation." The Appellate Division, Second
Department acknowledged that there was no binding precedent for them to follow, but
they found the definition set for by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to be
persuasive. The Second Circuit set forth three factors to be considered when defining a
"vessel in navigation." First, whether the structure was being used primarily as a work
platform during a reasonable period of time immediately preceding the accident; second,
whether the structure was moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and
third, whether, despite being capable of movement, any transportation function
performed by the structure was merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a
work platfom1. Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co . , Inc., 82 F. 3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.
1996).
In reviewing evidence submitted by the City's motion, the court found that the
barge at issue was indeed not a "vessel in navigation." At the time of the incident the
barge had no means of self-propulsion and was being used primarily as a work platform
to fuel and oil ferries. The barge was also moored at the time of the accident and the last
time it was used to transport cargo was back in 1 989 during a tugboat strike. The court
held that this evidence was sufficient to support the City's argument that the barge was
not a "vessel in navigation" and therefore, the Plaintiff was not a "seaman."
The Appellate Division, Second Department further addressed the lower court's
holding by looking to the City's prior position concerning the plaintiffs claim for
worker's compensation.
The plaintiff had applied for and received worker's
compensation. At a proceeding for the claim, the City argued that benefits were only
payable upon waiver of the plaintiffs federal claim under the Jones Act. The Supreme
Court held this to mean that the City believed plaintiff was entitled to collect under the
Jones Act. The Appellate Division found that the City did not make such an argument
and that although the plaintiff received worker's compensation, it did not constitute a
finding that the plaintiff was a "seaman." The order of the Supreme Court was reversed
and the complaint dismissed.
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